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Research on the effect of employment protection legislation (EPL) on unemployment is extensive. However, results are ambigu-
ous and were not able to show a clear pattern of how EPL is affecting labour market outcomes. Recent research has focussed
on the effect of EPL on youth unemployment, linking higher protection to higher unemployment among young labour market
entrants compared to their adult peers. Moreover, it is argued that EPL might not have a universal effect on youth unemploy-
ment but must be considered in an interplay of institutional factors, including vocational specificity. Based on these findings,
this thesis provides a comprehensive assessment of the effects of EPL and vocational specificity on the labour market chances
of young people compared to adults. As young people in particular often find their way into the labour market via temporary
contracts, it is distinguished between EPL for regular and temporary contracts. A total of 28 OECD countries are examined
from 1985 to 2013 using OECD data. In line with previous research, there appear to be no main effects of regular EPL or the
vocational specificity on its own on the level of youth unemployment or the youth-to-adult unemployment ratio, but there is
a positive effect of temporary EPL on the youth-to-adult ratio. This suggests that especially for young people deregulation of
these contracts – contrary to the usual theoretical assumptions – can have a positive effect on their labour market situation.
Keywords: Labour market; EPL; unemployment; youth; education.
1. Introduction
Unemployment is a much-discussed issue in national
governments and international organisations. Comparative
Worldbank statistics show that most countries have seen an
increase in youth unemployment in recent years and that
youth unemployment is generally much higher than adult
unemployment (Zimmermann et al., 2013) while there are
clear differences in the unemployment rates of young peo-
ple between 15 and 24 years across the OECD1. Especially
labour market institutions and employment protection legis-
lation are said to have a strong influence on unemployment.
Employ-ment protection legislation (EPL hereafter) has very
often been associated with high unemployment, but there
is no consensus to confirm this link empirically and results
seem to be inconclusive (Nickell and Layard, 1999). Never-
theless, EPL has not been lost sight of, but it is increasingly
argued that strict EPL has a particularly negative impact on
1Blanchflower and Freeman (2000) provide a comprehensive review of
cross-national differences and trends.
young people, as they are less likely to be hired, as employ-
ers have no references and information on their productivity
and value to the company and thus fear high dismissal costs
in the event of a poor fit (Esping-Andersen, 2000; Cahuc
et al., 2004; Breen, 2005). Noelke (2015) and others show
through the replication of prior research that strict EPL, how-
ever, is not to blame for high youth unemployment – at least
not as the only factor. On the basis of these research re-
sults, the interconnectivity of different institutional factors
becomes relevant and scholars argue that EPL does not have
a clear effect on its own but depends on other contextual
factors (Brzinsky-Fay, 2017). An obvious link here is the
education system, which aims to prepare young people for
the labour market and comes out strongly in past research
as the institution that could make a difference. In addition
to many factors such as investment in education, compul-
sory schooling or tracking, vocational specificity stands out
as one crucial feature, since the link between schools and
the labour market is most dominant. Signalling theory as-
sumes that young people have a smoother school-to-work
transition in countries with high vocational specificity and
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a strong link between the education system and employers
(O’higgins, 2001; Cahuc et al., 2013; Eichhorst et al., 2013).
Here employers receive early signals about the productivity
and capacity of potential workers so the fit to the company
can be assessed better and more realistically. Since pupils in
a vocational system are better prepared for the real problems
and challenges faced in the labour market and get in touch
with companies at an early stage, youth unemployment is
expected to decrease (Quintini and Manfredi, 2009).
The most immediate departure points of this thesis are
studies from Breen (2005) and Brzinsky-Fay (2017), which
are the only ones working on the interlinkage of education
and EPL. Breen assumes that strict EPL leads to high youth-to-
adult unemployment, but that high vocational specificity can
offset these negative consequences. Accordingly, the youth-
to-adult unemployment rate should be highest for strict EPL
and low educational signalling and lowest for weak EPL and
high educational signalling - although Breen finds no exist-
ing countries combining the latter. Brzinsky-Fay suspects that
EPL on its own has no effect on the youth-to-adult unemploy-
ment ratio and only becomes important in combination with
other institutional factors. It is expected that strict EPL only
has a negative effect on the youth labour market situation if
vocational specificity is low. This thesis contributes to the lit-
erature and takes further the ideas of Breen and Brzinsky-Fay
by improving on their work as not only EPL on regular con-
tracts is examined but also the effect of EPL on temporary
contracts. Moreover, due to new data availability, this the-
sis expands on both, but especially on Breen’s study with re-
gard to the time period investigated, covering a significantly
longer period from 1985 - 2013.
The main expectation is in line with both that youth
labour market situations can only be understood in an com-
plex interplay of institutions: Regarding the main effects of
EPL, I expect that regular EPL will have no main influence on
its own (Noelke, 2015), but that strict regulations on tem-
porary contracts will have a positive effect on young people,
as employers will not be able to take uncontrolled advan-
tage of these insecure working conditions to get cheaper
and less protected workers. It is expected that the best
labour market setting for young people in terms of unem-
ployment reduction is one that combines low regulations
on regular contracts with strict regulations on temporary
contracts. In addition, the labour market situation of young
people in countries with high vocational specificity, which
creates a direct link between school and the labour market,
is strengthened. Generally, an interaction of the individual
factors is always assumed, so that neither EPL regular nor
vocational specificity alone are expected to have a significant
influence. Although the focus of this work is on the level of
youth unemployment, adult unemployment is also included
in the analysis using the youth-to-adult unemployment ratio
as the second dependent variable to examine the different
effects of EPL and vocational specificity on these two groups.
Especially with regard to the distinction between regular and
temporary contracts, it seems promising to include the ra-
tio to capture different effects on adults versus youth, since
permanent contracts are still the status quo for adults, while
temporary contracts are increasingly becoming the norm for
young people. Furthermore, the ratio can be used to proxy
the overall state of the labour market. New results could be
used to better understand the interplay between the regula-
tion of regular and temporary EPL and vocational specificity
with regard to future policy decisions in the field of labour
market regulation or the design of education systems to re-
duce unemployment. Methodically, different OLS regressions
are calculated with country-clustered robust standard errors
in order to extract the main effects of both types of EPL and
vocational specificity on youth unemployment and the youth-
to-adult unemployment ratio as well as possible interactions
between these key explanatory variables. Data for the two
dependent variables as well as indicators for strictness of
employment protection and secondary education vocational
enrolment as a proxy for educational signalling are taken
from different OECD databases.
In the following a literature review and the theoretical
framework with hypotheses are given in part two. Part three
covers the analytical strategy and contains information on
the comparative research design, variables and their opera-
tionalisations and the statistical methodology. In part four,
the descriptive results are reported first, followed by the re-
sults of the regression analyses and the robustness checks.
Finally, a critical evaluation of this thesis with its limitations
follows in the conclusion and an outlook on future research
opportunities is provided.
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
2.1. Employment Protection Legislation and Youth Unem-
ployment
While many things can play a role in the institutional
framework when it comes to explanations of unemploy-
ment, such as minimum wages, education and training or
active labour market policies (Salvador and Leiner-Killinger,
2008), employment protection in particular is often associ-
ated with unemployment and job insecurity among work-
ers – especially young labour market entrants (Jimeno and
Rodriguez-Palenzuela, 2002; Esping-Andersen, 2000; Organ-
isation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2004;
Breen, 2005). Employment protection legislation includes
all the provisions on job security, e.g. severance pay or no-
tice, which restrict employers’ abilities to dismiss workers.
The main function is to stabilise workers and their employ-
ment relationships and secure their jobs (Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development, 2004). High EPLs
thus generate costs for employers if they dismiss workers
with permanent contracts (for an overview, see Esping-
Andersen, 2000; Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development, 2013; Gebel and Giesecke, 2011), so that
fewer employment changes take place (Bukodi and Robert,
2007; DiPrete, 2002).
Even though EPL has often been associated with unem-
ployment (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Botero et al., 2004;
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Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2005; Feldmann, 2009; Fialová and
Schneider, 2009; Nickell, 1997), past research has not yet
been able to find a common consensus regarding the impact
of strict EPL on the aggregated unemployment rate (Nickell
and Layard, 1999). Some studies find no influence at all or
even a positive influence of EPL on the employment rate (Al-
lard and Lindert, 2006; Amable et al., 2007; Belot and van
Ours, 2004; Cazes and Nesporova, 2007; Griffith et al., 2007;
Rovelli and Bruno, 2008). Some other studies were able to
show a strong effect of strict EPL on turnover but could not
find any effect on aggregated unemployment or unemploy-
ment rates (Kugler and Pica, 2008; Marinescu, 2009). A po-
tential reason why past research might not have been able to
find clear results is that there seem to be two mechanisms of
EPL that work in opposite directions and thus possibly bal-
ance each other out (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990).
On the one hand, there is a negative effect of strict EPL
for all those who want to (re-)enter the labour market. Em-
ployers will be less likely to hire new employees under strong
regulations as they fear high dismissal costs if the employee
does not prove to be a good fit. They will have to take into
account future dismissal costs when hiring new staff, so that
the benefits of hiring new staff are reduced and recruitment
rates therefore decrease (Blossfeld et al., 2008). It is assumed
that strict EPL restricts market flexibility and that employers
do not hire new employees even in good economic times. On
the other hand, however, strict EPL also has a positive effect
for all those insiders who are already employed. With strict
EPL redundancies are made costly with an aim to reduce the
turnover, stabilise new employment relationships and protect
workers from quick dismissals.
Studies show that both mechanisms are happening simul-
taneously as strict EPL reduces hiring and limits employee
turnover on one hand but also prolongs existing employment
relationships by reducing firing rates (Organisation for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development, 1999, 2004; Kugler
and Pica, 2008; Marinescu, 2009). Thus, a general theo-
retical and empirical relationship between EPL and aggre-
gated unemployment could not be found (Nickell and Layard,
1999; Baccaro and Rei, 2007; Kahn, 2012), as it is a possible
interpretation that the opposing effects of EPL outlined above
have an equal impact on the aggregated unemployment rate
(Noelke, 2015). As both mechanisms may balance each other
out, it is the next step to look at different groups and not
just at the aggregated unemployment rate to find out if the
mechanisms might work differently for different groups. The
decisive factor that emerged in the literature is the compar-
ison between young people and adults. Strict EPL is cited
in many studies as the main cause of integration problems
of young people into the labour market and resulting youth
unemployment (Esping-Andersen, 2000; Cahuc et al., 2004;
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development,
2006; Breen, 2005; Boeri and van Ours, 2008).
While the protection argument for labour market insiders
applies to both groups, the negative effect of decreased hir-
ing rates might be particularly relevant for young people, so
that they are more affected by these negative consequences
than adults. In their school-to-work transition young peo-
ple try to find their first job and take the first step into the
labour market. However, if employers have high dismissal
costs, they are more inhibited to hire new employees, which
has a particularly negative impact on young people who al-
ways start as labour market outsiders when leaving educa-
tion. Looking at the situation of young people, it can be
seen that a reduction in job offers through strict EPL makes
job search more difficult as the school-to-work transition is
prolonged until the first employment is entered (Wolbers,
2007) and job opportunities for young unemployed people
are generally worse in countries with strict EPL (Russell and
O’Connell, 2001). Therefore, lower hiring rates might be
more consequential for young people in their school-to-work
transition than negative effects of higher dismissal rates for
labour market insiders when there is less regulation. Based
on this assumed relationship, there was consensus in inter-
national organisations (Organisation for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development, 2004, 2006; European Commission,
2006, 2011; World Bank, 2007) and across disciplines that
strict EPL increases youth unemployment in absolute terms
and in relation to adults in OECD countries (Addison and
Teixeira, 2003; Autor et al., 2006; Bertola et al., 2007; Blau
and Kahn, 1999; Boeri and van Ours, 2008; Botero et al.,
2004; Esping-Andersen, 2000; Kahn, 2012).
Although a large number of authors support the posi-
tive correlation between strict EPL and high youth unem-
ployment, doubts are increasingly emerging that question the
proposed link. Scholars from various disciplines and interna-
tional organisations are increasingly critical of the assump-
tion that EPL is a key driver of high youth unemployment.
Noelke (2015) shows in his literature review and the replica-
tion of prior research in a comprehensive sample of Western
European countries that a number of studies linking EPL with
high youth unemployment are statistically not robust. He
shows that the prevailing consensus that strict EPL is to blame
for high youth unemployment in the OECD is not backed
up with comprehensive evidence and agrees with previous
findings that could also find no consistent effects (Dieckhoff
and Steiber, 2012; Kahn, 2010; Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development, 1999). Brzinsky-Fay (2017)
shows with QCA that the claim that high employment protec-
tion legislation itself leads to high youth unemployment must
be refuted (Brzinsky-Fay, 2017), as must Gebel and Giesecke
(2016), who argue that more stringent employment protec-
tion legislation for regular contracts increases youth job inse-
curities, but does not lead to an increase in youth unemploy-
ment (Gebel and Giesecke, 2016) leading to the following
first hypothesis:
H1: EPL on regular contracts has no significant
impact on the level of youth unem-ployment and
the youth-to-adult unemployment ratio
While focussing on young people and their employability
in the context of EPL, the different forms of EPL - regulations
on regular and on temporary contracts - must also be consid-
ered more closely, as this distinction has been overlooked in
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many studies so far (Gebel and Giesecke, 2016; see Dieckhoff
and Steiber, 2012 for an exception). A moderately low corre-
lation with 0.31 in an analysis of Gebel and Giesecke (2016)
however, shows that both indices measure different features
of EPL and that therefore a distinction should definitely be
made. Permanent or regular contracts have no end of em-
ployment while temporary contracts have a predetermined
date of expiration (Gebel and Giesecke, 2011; Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2004). For em-
ployers to not simply replace permanent contracts with tem-
porary contracts, the use of temporary contracts has tradi-
tionally been very restricted with limits on the cumulative
duration of these contracts or the number of temporary con-
tracts that can be concluded in succession (Noelke, 2015).
Generally, an employment with a temporary contract is more
insecure and riskier because the end of an employment rela-
tionship is already foreseeable, and one has to take care of a
new job during employment to not slip into unemployment
after the end of a temporary employment.
In theory, there are two mechanisms of temporary con-
tracts (Giesecke and Groß, 2003): The ’integration view’ em-
phasises the positive advantages of temporary contracts, as
they can stimulate the flows on the labour market, increase
the number of hires and provide a first step into the labour
market. The ’segmentation view’, however, stresses a higher
risk of job loss due to shorter employment contracts. The
criticism of deregulation of temporary contracts seems to
predominate the literature, which convicts a deregulation of
temporary contracts while maintaining the same strict EPL
for regular contracts as a main reason for high youth un-
employment (S. and Dolado, 1994; Blanchard and Landier,
2002; Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002; European Commission,
2011). This already shows that the regulations of regular and
temporary contracts should always be considered in combi-
nation. While job security provisions in form of EPL on reg-
ular contracts have remained relatively strict over the past
decades, temporary contracts have been gradually deregu-
lated in many OECD countries (Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development, 2004; Gebel and Giesecke,
2011). Schönmann and Clauwaert (2012) show a trend dur-
ing the recession that more and more countries have liber-
alised and deregulated their labour markets for temporary
contracts and new forms of temporary contracts have been
created that are often less protected and explicitly targeted
at young people (Schönmann and Clauwaert, 2012). The
’partial deregulation’ (Blanchard and Landier, 2002) leads to
the fact that with high dismissal costs for permanent con-
tracts but low regulations for temporary contracts, there are
no longer any economic and monetary incentives to convert
temporary contracts into permanent ones. Young people are
thus in a ’trap’ of frequently changing temporary jobs, which
are usually paid less and only limited further training is pos-
sible (Quintini and Manfredi, 2009). It is therefore argued
that social inequalities are increased by the spread of tempo-
rary contracts (Gash and McGinnity, 2007) without creating
and improving new labour market opportunities for young
people, resulting in individual career risks and impairing so-
cial mobility (Barbieri, 2009; Cazes and Tonin, 2010; DiPrete
et al., 2006; Gebel, 2009; Giesecke and Groß, 2003; McGin-
nity et al., 2005). In addition, employers are given incentives
to replace permanent contracts with temporary contracts if
partial deregulation happens (Blanchard and Landier, 2002;
Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002; DiPrete et al., 2006; Kahn,
2010). Moreover, an increasing difference between dismissal
costs from regular to temporary contracts leads to a higher
flow of temporary jobs into unemployment (Blanchard and
Landier, 2002, see Centeno and Novo, 2012 for evidence).
It should be pointed out that young people in particu-
lar are disproportionately affected by this type of contract
and thus also by the consequences of constant deregula-
tion. Therefore, it is interesting to not only look at youth
unemployment but also at the youth-to-adult unemployment
ratio, which provides insights into how far young people
are more or differently affected by changes than adults.
Although time-unlimited contracts are the status quo of em-
ployment relationships among adults in the labour market
(Noelke, 2015), it turns out that the increasing number of
temporary contracts for all entry levels jobs affects dispro-
portionately young people, for whom this type of temporary
contract has become the norm in some countries (Organi-
sation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2014).
Young people in particular are thus automatically exposed
to a higher risk of unemployment due to the nature of their
employment contract, as the positive insider effect of strict
regular EPL does not apply to them. Furthermore, the desta-
bilising effect of temporary jobs for employment careers and
the failure of deregulation to lead to job growth for young
people is stressed (Barbieri, 2009; Giesecke and Groß, 2003;
Polavieja, 2003; Scherer, 2005; Barbieri, 2009). Gebel and
Giesecke (2016) show across countries and time that overall
partial deregulation was not successful in reducing the risk of
youth unemployment, but that instead the youth temporary
employment risk was increased (Gebel and Giesecke, 2016).
H2: Strict EPL on temporary contracts is decreas-
ing the level of youth unemployment and the
youth-to-adult unemployment ratio
It is expected that the effect of deregulation of tempo-
rary contracts depends on the level of regulation of regular
contracts, so the link of both types of EPL is crucial. Noelke
(2015) confirms this expectation and shows empirically that
youth unemployment rates rise when a country combines
high regulations for regular contracts with a deregulation
of temporary contracts, which is consistent with theoreti-
cal macroeconomic models (Blanchard and Landier, 2002;
Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002). What counts with regard to
general unemployment but especially youth unemployment
is therefore the link between regulations of regular and tem-
porary contracts. Thus, both types of EPL will be examined in
this thesis. The assumed best-case scenario for young people
is having low regulations on regular contracts, as employers
do not have to fear high dismissal costs if they want to em-
ploy labour market entrants on a secure regular contract and
simultaneously high regulations on temporary contracts, as
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a protection against being employed on insecure short-term
contracts over and over again without planning certainty and
with lower salaries. For adults, high regulations for tempo-
rary contracts are also important for this reason. For them,
however, strict EPLs on regular contracts are better, as they
are mostly labour market insiders and thus protected from
dismissal by many rules and high dismissal costs.
H3: The level of youth unemployment and the
youth-to-adult unemployment ratio is lowest in
countries with low EPL regular and high EPL
temporary
2.2. Linking Employment Protection Legislation and Educa-
tion
The theoretical and empirical backgrounds on EPL show
that the relationship between EPL and youth labour market
chances is not always clear, so that it seems logical to consider
other factors that might influence this interaction. The inter-
play of different factors seems to have been somewhat ne-
glected in the literature so far (with the exceptions of Breen,
2005 and Brzinsky-Fay, 2017). From a very detailed com-
parison of several countries, Zimmermann et al. (2013) con-
clude that a variety of factors influence the labour market sit-
uation of young people in a country, including the interplay of
economic growth, labour market regulation or education and
training systems. Avdagic (2015) also argues that the sole
liberalisation of employment protection laws by governments
will remain unsuccessful in the fight against unemployment.
In line with these interconnectivity arguments it is argued
that EPL might not have a universal effect on youth unem-
ployment but must be considered in an interplay of institu-
tional factors - what this work envisages to do with a focus on
the educational system. Since better educated young people
generally have better employment opportunities the connec-
tion to education is theoretically sound. A large number of
studies have empirically stated the positive effects for young
people of a closer link between training and the labour mar-
ket through vocational education paths (Allmendinger, 1989;
Gangl, 2003; Julkunen, 2010; Kerckhoff, 1995, 2000), which
leads to a reduction of youth unemployment (Breen, 2005;
Gangl, 2003; Quintini and Manfredi, 2009; Quintini et al.,
2007; Wolbers, 2007). Countries that have robust and broad
Vocational Education and Training (VET) systems and strong
employer-worker linkages had better transitions for labour
market entrants so far and have performed best during the
recession with regard to labour market outcomes for youth
- especially dual apprenticeship systems such as Germany or
Austria (Caroleo et al., 2017).
Education systems are characterised by very different fea-
tures such as investment in education, the teacher-student
ratio, compulsory school years, tracking or vocational speci-
ficity. From all these facets a factor is sought that repre-
sents a close link to the labour market, since the problems
of young people (compared to adults) on the labour market
are to be investigated. Hence, vocational specificity seems
to be the most promising element as it has a major influ-
ence on the success rates of the school-to-work transition
period (Banerji et al., 2015; Cahuc et al., 2013; Eichhorst
et al., 2013; O’higgins, 2001). It is understood as the degree
to which an education system sends clear signals to employ-
ers about a pupil’s qualification and can be measured by the
share of students enrolled in vocational tracks. It indicates to
what extent vocational specialisation already takes place in
schools (Brzinsky-Fay, 2017), whereby it is intended to teach
young people practice-oriented knowledge and skills (Eich-
horst et al., 2012), which are usually also transferable be-
tween different employers (Beck and Katz, 2011). Especially
in an age of financial crises and austerity, VET is often seen
as a silver bullet for tackling the problem of youth unemploy-
ment (Eichhorst et al., 2012). Sociologists have come to the
consensus that the two central factors that are important for
young people seeking their first job are the degree of specific
rather than general skills and the strength of the link between
educational systems and the labour market (Allmendinger,
1989; Hannan et al., 1996; Maurice et al., 1986; Müller and
Shavit, 1998). When a company wants to hire new employ-
ees, who are just leaving school, it is a challenge to assess
the potential benefits of this new recruitment as there is no
prior work experience to rely on. Thus, one of the main rea-
sons for youth unemployment is the lack of information an
employer has about the qualifications of a labour market en-
trant (Levels et al., 2014; Spence, 1973). A greater focus on
vocational training should facilitate transition from school to
work by creating a closer link between schools and employers
that sends a clear signal to employers about the productiv-
ity and skills of a potential applicant (Breen, 2005; Spence,
1973; Stigler, 1962; Stiglitz, 1975).
As important as vocational specificity seems to be for
young people and their connection to the labour market,
Brzinsky-Fay concludes that this is not the only aspect that
can lead to an improvement in youth unemployment, as this
area must always be addressed in interaction with other in-
stitutions. (Brzinsky-Fay, 2017)
H4: Vocational Specificity has no main effect on
the level of youth unemployment and the youth-
to-adult unemployment ratio
In their studies Breen (2005) and Brzinsky-Fay (2017)
examine the interplay between vocational specificity and em-
ployment protection legislation and show that youth unem-
ployment appears to be low in countries with strong educa-
tional signalling and liberal labour market policies. The re-
sults imply that an education system with a strong vocational
component and a link between education and the labour mar-
ket can compensate for the negative effects of strong employ-
ment protection against dismissal. For the combination of
EPL regular and vocational specificity, it is assumed that it is
best for young people to have low regulations for regular con-
tracts, so that employers can hire them without fear of high
dismissal costs, and, additionally, high educational signalling
to ensure early on that employers can assess the abilities of
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Table 1: Overview Hypotheses and Previous Results




Breen (2005) Brzinsky-Fay (2017)
H1: EPL on regular contracts has no significant impact on
the level of youth unemployment and the youth-to-adult
unemployment ratio
Strict EPL regular = Higher
youth-to-adult unemployment
Effect only measured in con-
junction with other institu-
tional variables
H2: Strict EPL on temporary contracts is decreasing the
level of youth unemployment and the youth-to-adult un-
employment ratio
- -
H3: The level of youth unemployment and the youth-to-
adult unemployment ratio is lowest in countries with low
EPL regular and high EPL temporary
- -
H4: Vocational Specificity has no main effect on the level
of youth unemployment and the youth-to-adult unemploy-
ment ratio
Effect only measured in con-
junction with other institu-
tional variables
Effect only measured in con-
junction with other institu-
tional variables
H5a: The level of youth unemployment and the youth-to-
adult unemployment ratio is lowest in countries with low
EPL (regular) and high vocational specificity
confirmed confirmed
H5b: The level of youth unemployment and the youth-to-
adult unemployment ratio is lowest in countries with high
EPL (temporary) and high vocational specificity
- -
potential applicants to establish a strong connection between
schools and employers.
H5a: The level of youth unemployment and the
youth-to-adult unemployment ratio is lowest in
countries with low EPL (regular) and high voca-
tional specificity
With regard to the interplay between temporary EPL and
vocational specificity, it is assumed that young people have
the best labour market opportunities if temporary contracts
are subject to high regulations so that employers cannot em-
ploy them continuously in these insecure and often more
poorly paid jobs without regulations.
H5b: The level of youth unemployment and the
youth-to-adult unemployment ratio is lowest in
countries with high EPL (temporary) and high
vocational specificity
3. Analytical Strategy
3.1. Comparative Research Design
Since youth unemployment levels and the youth-to-adult
unemployment ratio as the dependent variables differ sub-
stantially across countries and over time, a comparative
quantitative analysis with a statistical, variable oriented ap-
proach seems most promising (Della Porta, 2008; Lijphart,
1971). Cross-national and time-series data are used to find
out how these variables are influenced by the two EPL types
and how this relationship may be moderated by vocational
specificity. To ensure that the countries are as similar as
possible and that sufficiently harmonised data is available
to make meaningful comparisons the analysis here limits it-
self to an OECD sample of 28 countries. As many countries
as possible were selected that have different labour market
regulations and also represent a balanced sample of Liberal,
Conservative, Mediterranean and Social-Democratic employ-
ment regimes (Bukodi and Robert, 2007). The case selection
is based on variations in the independent variables, i.e. large
enough variation when it comes to labour market regulations
and vocational approaches in education which is important
for a conclusive research design (Della Porta, 2008; King
et al., 1994). A timeframe from 1985 - 2013 is selected to
cover as many years as possible, including the whole period
of EPL data that is currently available from the OECD.
Breen (2005) and Brzinsky-Fay (2017) studies are chosen
as the most immediate departure studies as they both exam-
ine the influence of EPL on youth labour market chances and
its interaction with vocational specificity. While they deal
only exclusively with EPL on regular contracts, this paper
makes a distinction between EPL on regular and temporary
contracts, which hasn’t been paid much attention yet (in in-
teractions with vocational specificity). Since young people
in particular are increasingly entering the labour market on
temporary contracts and deregulation of these contracts in
recent years has led to increased uncertainty, a more detailed
examination of these two forms can shed new light on the
effects of EPL reforms. A study which exclusively examines
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the influence of regular EPL on youth in the labour market
oversees the majority of young people who are employed on
temporary contracts and are not affected by the mechanisms
of regular EPL. Compared to both previous studies, the time
period is extended by 24 (compared to Breen) and 19 years
(compared to Brzinsky-Fay). EPL trends across European and
OECD countries have shown fewer changes and reforms re-
garding regular EPL, but a clear trend towards deregulations
of temporary contracts – providing a new contribution by ob-
serving both EPL variables over a longer time-period. Lastly,
compared to Breen (2005) the defined age group of adults is
extended from 25-54 years to 25-64 years, since this division
represents the labour market situation much more realisti-
cally, based on the average retirement age of 65.8 for men
and 65.5 for women across OECD countries (Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2019).
3.2. Variables and Operationalisation
My dataset comprises observations from 28 OECD coun-
tries while covering a time period from 1985 to 2013 to study
how EPL for regular and temporary contracts is influencing
youth labour market chances and how this link might be con-
ditioned by a country’s vocational specificity. Annual data
is included from the following countries: Australia (AUS),
Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Czech Re-
public (CZE), Denmark (DNK), Finland (FIN), France (FRA),
Germany (DEU), Greece (GRC), Hungary (HUN), Ireland
(IRL), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Korea (KOR), Mexico (MEX),
Netherlands (NLD), New Zealand (NZL), Norway (NOR),
Poland (POL), Portugal (PRT), Slovak Republic (SVK), Spain
(ESP), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (CHE), Turkey (TUR),
United Kingdom (GBR) and the United States (USA). Sum-
mary statistics for each country can be found in the Appendix
in Table 1.
3.2.1. Dependent Variables
Two different dependent variables are chosen to reflect
the labour market situation of young people: The level of
youth unemployment and the youth-to-adult unemployment
ratio. The level of youth unemployment is chosen because it
was used as the dependent variable in a number of influen-
tial previous studies (e.g. Noelke, 2015). Young people are
considered to be all people aged 15-24. Even though there is
no “clear cut definition of youth” (Eurostat, 2009, p.17), this
range is chosen here in order to ensure the greatest possi-
ble comparability with previous studies in this research area
(e.g. Noelke, Breen and Brzinsky-Fay). Results regarding
the interaction of the variables can thus be seen more eas-
ily in the context of previous research. Data is taken from
the OECD Labour Force Statistics (LFS) database. For the
second dependent variable – the ratio of youth to adult un-
employment – the same database is used where the youth
unemployment rate (15-24 years) is divided by the adult un-
employment rate (26-64 years), which is a measure that can
partially control for cyclical economic conditions (Breen and
Buchmann, 2002). This is in line with research from Breen
and Brzinsky-Fay and moreover, in contrast to the youth un-
employment rate alone, it can reflect the disadvantages of
young people in relation to the adult working group.2
3.2.2. Key Explanatory Variables
A central key explanatory variable is the degree of EPL
where measures are taken from the OECD Employment
database. The strictness of employment protection is di-
vided in two separate measure – indicators on regular and
temporary employment – with scores ranging from 0 to 6 and
higher values indicating stronger worker protection against
dismissal. The ‘EPL regular’ indicator summarises the incon-
veniences for employers when they want to dismiss individ-
ual workers on regular or open-ended contracts, as well as
rules on notice periods, severance pay or valid reasons for
dismissal in general. The second indicator ‘EPL temporary’
refers to the severity of the regulations for the creation of
fixed-term contracts and temporary work contracts on the
one hand and contractual regulations concerning wages, re-
cruitment procedures and working conditions on the other
(Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development,
2019). Although weaknesses of these indicators were taken
into consideration (Eichhorst et al., 2008), they are used here
due to a lack of comprehensive alternatives. The period to be
examined (1985-2013) was chosen according to the avail-
ability of EPL data for the majority of countries. The 1980s
show hardly any reform activities without record of any re-
forms or only changes with a marginal impact (fRDB-IZA
Social Reforms Database, 2010). The following 1990s and
2000s, on the other hand, show more significant changes
in several countries, both for regular and temporary em-
ployment (see Venn, 2009 for a detailed assessment of EPL
reforms). My country selection of 28 OECD countries shows
six different trends regarding the development of EPL: A par-
tial deregulation, where regular EPL remains constant and
only temporary EPL is deregulated, upward and downward
trends for both types of EPL, no changes at all, a deregula-
tion of regular contracts combined with a higher regulation
of temporary contracts and lastly an initial deregulation with
subsequent re-regulation of temporary contracts. Accord-
ingly, Figure 1 in the Appendix shows how the two EPL types
have developed from 1985 to 2013 - exemplarily illustrated
with individual countries - with blue lines representing reg-
ular EPL and orange lines representing temporary EPL.
For the other key explanatory variables – vocational speci-
ficity - Worldbank data is used for vocational, general and
total enrolment in secondary education. The strength with
which an educational system sends clear signals to employers
about the performance of potential applicants is calculated
by dividing the secondary vocational enrolment by the sec-
ondary total enrolment. The selected OECD countries form a
large variety with regard to their educational design of the
ideal skill formation regimes according to Busemeyer and
2Due to data limitations, it is unfortunately not possible to take the NEET
rate here, which could potentially capture the labour market situation of
young people even better.
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Iversen (2012), who classify countries according to the two
categories "public investment in VET" and "firm involvement
in VET".3 The literature shows several alternatives as to how
different VET systems can be classified and which countries
are assigned to them (see as an example Hanushek et al.,
2011 in the Appendix Table 2; Eichhorst et al., 2015; Pohl
and Walther, 2007). Hadjivassiliou et al. (2015) highlight
Germany and the Netherlands as the most successful exam-
ples with the most efficient integration of 15-19 years into
the labour market with resulting high employment figures
among young people over several years and stability during
in various economic phases, such as the financial crisis (Had-
jivassiliou et al., 2015). Even though some scholars specif-
ically focus on upper secondary education when it comes
to the share of vocational education (Breen, 2005) only the
general secondary level is used here as the Worldbank pro-
vides the most comprehensive dataset regarding my coun-
try sample and time frame but does not distinguishing be-
tween various levels of secondary education. However, this
does not represent a limitation since the expectations do not
differentiate between different stages of vocational educa-
tion nor do other scholars in their research (Caroleo et al.,
2017). It should be further noted at this point that I am aware
that this indicator represents a questionable operationalisa-
tion, since no distinction can be made between school-based
and workplace-based training and the pure enrolment statis-
tics can be misleading without sufficient background knowl-
edge of the design of the respective education systems of
the countries. It is precisely a dual system of apprentice-
ship, as in the German-speaking countries, that can ensure
a smooth school-to-work transition through a positive effect
of vocational specificity (Russell and O’Connell, 2001; Van
Der Velden and Wolbers, 2003). However, there are countries
such as Italy or the Czech Republic, which also have high en-
rolment rates in vocational education programmes, but their
link between schools and employers is very weak and thus
a lack of specific skills of vocational pupils does not result
in better positioning on the labour market (Avdagic, 2015).
But since no comprehensive data is yet available for these de-
tailed differences, this analysis draws on the general share of
vocational enrolment, whereby a closer examination of these
differences can be an exciting task for future research.
3.2.3. Control Variables
As it is the core of statistical interference to incorporate
control variables in order to consider potential confounding
factors (Angrist and Pischke, 2009), three macroeconomic
controls are used in this study. Poor macroeconomic condi-
tions can increase competition for jobs between young peo-
ple, making smooth transitions into the labour market more
difficult and exposing young people to the risk of dismissal
due to the overall economic situation, as they are the least
protected (Gangl, 2002). GDP per capita from the World-
3For a very detailed overview of an analysis of different country clusters
regarding vocational education see Zimmermann et al., 2013.
bank database is used to control for the impact of macroeco-
nomic conditions on activities of the welfare state and public
expenditures for labour market programmes. In order to cap-
ture the influence of inequality, the GINI coefficient from the
World Inequality Database (WID) and the Estimated House-
hold Income Inequality Data Set (EHII) is also taken into
account. Finally, the general level of unemployment is con-
trolled for with data on general unemployment (15+ years)
from the International Labour Organisation (ILO) but only
in models where the ratio of youth-to-adult unemployment
is used as a dependent variable. All data used was collected
before this research and is publicly available.
3.3. Methods
To find out what influence the two versions of EPL have
on the level of youth unemployment and the youth-to-adult
unemployment ratio and whether this relationship may be
moderated by vocational specificity, OLS regressions with ro-
bust standard errors are calculated. As the individual obser-
vations within a country are not independent, the standard
errors are clustered by countries to control for the correlation
between the errors within the same country-unit over time.
This technique is used to generate robust estimates of stan-
dard errors that compensate for the fact that the observations
are independent between countries, but not within them (see
also Breen, 2005).
3.3.1. Missing Data
The biggest challenge in creating the dataset is the prob-
lem of missing data points. This missingness was addressed
by using linear interpolation to fill in missing values, assum-
ing a country-specific linear time trend for the gaps in the
data (StataCorp, 2015). A maximum of four missing years
were interpolated. The fact that a variable has no values at
the beginning or at the end of the sample period was not ad-
dressed further, as no substantial statistical problems arise
(Beck and Katz, 2011). Missing data should ideally be ad-
dressed by multiple imputation (Beck and Katz, 2011), where
relevant information is extracted from the data and then mul-
tiple values are imputed for each data-gap, creating multiple
"complete" datasets (Honaker and King, 2010; Honaker et al.,
2011). Even though this does not limit the following analy-
ses, it can be addressed in future research.
3.3.2. Robustness Checks
To ensure that my results are not driven by any one coun-
try, I re-estimate all models excluding one country at a time.
The evaluation of these models can provide information on
whether the model is susceptible to changes in the sample
and whether individual countries strongly influence the over-
all results. Furthermore, a distinction of two periods is made
(pre-2000 and post-2000) to check whether the results differ
based on the time period chosen. This is to control for major
institutional changes over time.
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3.3.3. Stages of Analysis
At the beginning, all variables are displayed descriptively
first. For this purpose, an average is calculated for all 28
countries for each year from 1985 to 2013 in order to make
general trends visible across all countries. The results can be
seen in Figures 1-4. Then OLS regressions with robust stan-
dard errors are calculated for different models. All analyses
are calculated with the level of youth unemployment as the
first dependent variable (Table 1), followed by the ratio of
youth-to-adult unemployment as the second dependent vari-
able (Table 2). A total of nine models are calculated each for
both dependent variables. Models 1-3 test the influence of
the two types of EPL on the dependent variable. Control vari-
ables are not included in any model. Model 1 tests the sole
influence of EPL for regular contracts, Model 2 the sole influ-
ence of EPL for temporary contracts and Model 3 combines
both types. Starting with Model 4, the two control variables
GDP per capita and GINI coefficient are added to the level of
youth unemployment, while the overall unemployment rate
is added additionally in Table 2. In Model 5, the third key
explanatory variable vocational specificity is introduced, so
that in this model all key explanatory variables are exam-
ined together. Finally, the Models 6-9 test interaction effects,
whereby Model 6 examines the interaction between EPL reg-
ular and EPL temporary, Model 7 the interaction between EPL
regular and vocational specificity, Model 8 the interaction be-
tween EPL temporary and vocational specificity and Model 9
all three interaction terms. Robustness checks are displayed
in Tables 3 to 6.
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive Results
Figure 1 compares the development of youth unem-
ployment rates and adult unemployment rates across all
28 countries from 1985 to 2013. It shows that the level
of adult unemployment (orange line) has hardly changed
over the entire period and moves exclusively between the 5
and 10% mark. Youth unemployment (blue line), however,
shows strong fluctuations and, with one exception in 2010,
is always higher than adult unemployment, so young people
seem to have it more difficult in the labour market than adults
when it comes to their employment prospects. The figures
for youth unemployment range from around 7% (in 2010)
to peak values of over 30% in the crisis years 2007/2008,
showing a significant negative impact of the financial crisis
on the labour market situation of young people (compared
to a moderate impact on their adult counterparts). Fig-
ure 2 adopts the blue graph of youth unemployment and
now shows in orange - displayed on the secondary Y-axis -
the youth-to-adult unemployment rate, which lies predom-
inantly between 2.5 and 3%. Hence, Figure 2 shows the
two dependent variables to be examined. Figures 3 and 4
show the three key explanatory variables, whereby EPL for
regular and EPL for temporary contracts are summarized
together in Figure 3. Across all countries temporary EPL saw
a clear downward trend and is continuously deregulated,
while regular EPL remains mostly constant. Furthermore, it
can be seen that already at the beginning in 1985 regular
contracts are regulated much more strictly than temporary
contracts, whereby regulations for regular contracts at the
end of the measurement period in 2013 just reach the start-
ing point of regulation for temporary contracts with a value
of 2 (on a scale of 0-6). The often-stated trend towards
’partial deregulation’ is thus also evident in the countries
used here. Examples of individual countries showing various
EPL trends over time can be found in Figure 1 (Appendix).
Figure 4 concludes by summarising the development of vo-
cational specificity in secondary education, although no clear
trend can be discerned here. Overall, the values are between
22 and 30%, which describes the proportion of pupils who
are in a vocational track compared to the total enrolment in
secondary education across all countries. A more detailed
country-by-country table displaying the main descriptive re-
sults of the dependent and all independent variables can be
found in the Appendix (Table 1). Figure 5 plots youth unem-
ployment and the youth-to-adult unemployment rate against
both EPL indicators for regular and temporary contracts. In
this comprehensive sample there appears to be little support
for the often-proclaimed relationship between strict regula-
tion and higher youth unemployment when looking at the
bivariate associations.
4.2. Regression Analyses
Table 1 reports estimates from ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression with country clustered robust standard er-
rors using the level of youth unemployment. Table 2 adopts
the same model building structure but uses the youth-to-
adult unemployment ratio instead.
In Table 1 no regression coefficient of the main effects or
the interaction terms is statistically significant. It shows that
neither EPL for regular contracts, nor EPL for temporary con-
tracts, nor the vocational specificity have a significant influ-
ence on the level of youth unemployment in the 28 countries
of this sample. Table 2 shows the same nine models but this
time using the ratio of youth-to-adult unemployment as the
dependent variable. Again, a stronger regulation of regular
contracts has no statistically significant impact on the ratio
of youth-to-adult unemployment. The results for both de-
pendent variables thus confirm the results of Noelke (2015)
who found no consistent evidence that stronger regulation
of regular contracts is associated with higher youth unem-
ployment. Yet they disagree with Breen (2005) who found a
significant effect indicating that higher EPL for regular con-
tracts will lead to an increase in youth unemployment.
In Table 2 the coefficients of EPL temporary are statisti-
cally significant at the 5% level in Models 2 to 5, showing a
positive coefficient. Temporary EPL does therefore not affect
the level of youth unemployment but the ratio of youth-to-
adult unemployment. This means that in countries with a
stricter regulation of temporary contracts, the number of un-
employed youth increases compared to unemployed adults
so young people are more affected by negative consequences
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Figure 1: Levels of youth unemployment and levels of adult unemployment (average across 28 OECD countries), 1985-2013
Figure 2: Levels of youth unemployment and the youth-to-adult unemployment ratio (average across 28 OECD countries),
1985-2013
Figure 3: Employment protection legislation for regular and temporary contracts (average across 28 OECD countries), 1985-
2013
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Figure 4: Share of secondary vocational enrolment in % (average across 28 OECD countries), 1985-2013
Figure 5: Bivariate associations between both types of EPL and youth-to-adult unemployment ratio (first row) and youth
unemployment rates (second row), 28 OECD countries, 1985–2013
regarding their employment status than adults in the same
country. Breen and Brzinsky-Fay did not investigate this rela-
tionship, but the results contradict the in previous literature
embedded Hypothesis 2 that higher regulations of temporary
EPL have a positive effect on young people and their labour
market chances. Moreover, the interaction term of EPL reg-
ular and EPL temporary in Table 2 is significant in models
6 and 9. These positive coefficients states that higher levels
of EPL regular strengthen the positive effect of EPL tempo-
rary. In a country with strict EPL on temporary contracts the
labour market situation for young people is therefore worse
compared to adults and they are more often unemployed,
and this trend will be even stronger in countries that also
have strict EPL on regular contracts. Vocational Specificity is
not significant in any of the models as a main effect, confirm-
ing Hypothesis 4. Model 9 including all three interactions
achieves the highest model fit (R-squared= 0.2557) whereby
approx. 1/4 of the variance of the dependent variable can be
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Table 2: OLS regression with country clustered robust standard errors – Level of youth unemployment
Country clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The constant is not reported. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5%
level. * Significant at the 10% level.
Dependent variable
Level of youth unemployment



































































































N 744 744 744 717 627 627 627 627 627
R2 0.0251 0.0456 0.0491 0.1377 0.1515 0.1707 0.152 0.1719 0.1816
explained by this model.
Tables 3-6 show a robustness check with two separate
time-periods – before and after 2000. Again, both dependent
variables are examined - the level of youth unemployment in
Tables 3 and 4 and the youth-to-adult unemployment ration
in Tables 5 and 6. Seven different models are calculated for
each time period. Model 1 examines the influence of the two
EPL key explanatory variables (EPL regular and EPL tempo-
rary) on the dependent variable. Model 2 adds vocational
specificity. Models 3 to 5 additionally add single interactions
while Models 6 and 7 combine interactions. All models in-
clude all control variables.
The robustness check with the level of youth unemploy-
ment as a dependent variable (Tables 3 and 4) shows a sig-
nificant interaction of the two types of EPL before 2000 as
already interpreted above. Moreover, M5 in Table 3 reveals a
slightly significant value at the 10% level for the interaction
of EPL temporary and vocational specificity. No coefficient in
the after 2000 period is significant. Tables 5 and 6 with the
ratio of youth-to-adult unemployment show several statisti-
cally significant values. Again - before 2000 - the EPL reg-
ular EPL temporary interaction is significant. Furthermore,
it appears that stricter temporary EPL increases youth unem-
ployment significantly more than adult unemployment. This
is particularly the case before 2000 (Table 5). After 2000,
this link appears to be conditioned by the degree of voca-
tional specificity implying that the association only shows
up in countries with higher level of vocational specificity (M
5-7 Table 6). The positive effect of temporary EPL on the
youth-to-adult unemployment rate is therefore strengthened
by a higher level of vocational specificity – and not weak-
ened as assumed in theoretical section where it is argued that
a stronger vocational orientation sends clear signals to em-
ployers about the skills of young people and thus reduces
youth unemployment. So far, no sound arguments for this
connection can be found in the literature. It is assumed that
vocational specificity often only works in conjunction with
other factors, but even then, only positively for young peo-
ple. It might thus be the case that the very small effects with
coefficients around 0.01 and a marginal significance at the
10% level may no longer be visible with a different country
or time sample and varying variable operationalisations. As a
further robustness check, the regressions were recalculated,
whereby each time a different country was excluded from
the analysis in order to test whether the results are driven by
one country. However, the results show that the model is not
susceptible to changes in the sample (see Tables 3-6 in the
Appendix).
Breen’s findings on the interaction between regular EPL
and vocational specificity show that vocational specificity
can compensate for the problem of higher youth unemploy-
ment in countries with strict EPL regulation. It is confirmed
that the ratio of youth-to-adult unemployment is lowest in
countries with high educational signalling (Breen, 2005).
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Table 3: OLS regression with country clustered robust standard errors – Ratio of youth-to-adult unemployment





















































































































N 744 744 744 717 627 627 627 627 627
R2 0.0363 0.1268 0.127 0.1737 0.2008 0.2537 0.2030 0.2085 0.2557
Brzinsky-Fay corroborates this connection using QCA, con-
firming that strict regular EPL is only associated with high
relative youth unemployment in case of low vocational speci-
ficity. However, vocational training alone is not sufficient to
combat youth unemployment, as this must always be seen in
conjunction with other institutions (Brzinsky-Fay, 2017).
As the findings of this thesis do not coincide with the re-
sults of Breen (2005) and Brzinsky-Fay (2017), individual
countries will be examined in more detail in order to possibly
get a better understanding of the results. Concrete country
examples will be used to show how countries can be cate-
gorised with regard to regular and temporary EPL and how
the two dependent variables look in the respective categories.
For all 28 countries, the mean value for regular and tempo-
rary EPL over the entire period is used. Then the median for
both types of EPL is calculated, whereby all countries above
the median are divided into "strong" EPL and all below the
median into "weak" EPL. The mean value of the dependent
variables for each country is also calculated. Tables 5 and 6
show the allocation of countries based on the EPL categories
and lists all countries if their level of youth unemployment or
their youth-to-adult unemployment rates are above the me-
dian. Here, too, a division into before and after 2000 has
been made.
The first table showing the level of youth unemploy-
ment finds no clear relationship between EPL regulations
and youth unemployment. However, Table 8, where the
ratio of youth-to-adult unemployment was chosen, shows
a pattern regarding the relationship between EPL and the
youth-to-adult unemployment ratio. In line with the re-
gression analyses, countries where the youth are more hit
by unemployment than the adults primarily tend to be those
with strong EPL regulations, especially strong temporary EPL
regulations. This country overview shows that significantly
more countries have a comparatively high youth-to-adult
unemployment rate if both temporary and regular contracts
are subject to high regulations (pre-2000 in seven countries,
post-2000 in six countries), while only two countries with
weak EPL on regular and strong EPL on temporary contracts
have comparatively worse labour market chances for young
people compared to adults. Thus, in a country with strong
EPL on regular contracts and also strong EPL on temporary
contracts, the labour market situation of young people is
worse compared to that of adults, which is the case for ex-
ample in France, Greece or Italy both before and after 2000.
Table 10 shows once again all hypotheses and the results
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Table 4: Robustness Check before 2000 – Level of youth unemployment
Dependent variable Before 2000








































































































N 333 308 308 308 308 308 308
R2 0.1811 0.2023 0.3231 0.2072 0.2686 0.2687 0.3417
Table 5: Robustness Check after 2000 – Level of youth unemployment
Dependent variable After 2000








































































































N 384 319 319 319 319 319 319
R2 0.1441 0.1546 0.1547 0.1553 0.1556 0.1567 0.1568
Country clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 6: Robustness Check before 2000 – Ratio of youth-to-adult unemployment
Country clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
Dependent variable Before 2000























































































































N 333 308 308 308 308 308 308
R2 0.3618 0.4263 0.5249 0.4328 0.4326 0.4361 0.5285
of this thesis regarding the two dependent variables. Only
the results over the entire period from 1985 – 2013 are re-
ported in the table, while further specifications from the ro-
bustness checks before and after 2000 are noted with aster-
isks if they differ from the general results. This overview sug-
gests a complex interplay of regular and temporary EPL, and
it seems conceivable that the temporary EPL effect is some-
how conditioned on the level of regular EPL so these two do
not act independently. A possible explanation for these un-
expected results that temporary EPL has a positive and not a
negative effect on the youth-to-adult unemployment rate is,
that in case of strict temporary EPL employers are reluctant
to hire young people even for insecure ‘labour market fringe’
jobs, as it is difficult to dismiss them later. The reasoning
would therefore be similar to that of strict EPL for regular
contracts, where it is assumed that employers would rather
not hire any new employees than those for whom they later
fear high dismissal costs. It would be possible that the na-
ture of the employment contract is not a determining factor
for employers to decide whether or not to recruit. If the regu-
lations and thus the costs associated with dismissal are high,
fewer people will be hired on both, regular and temporary
contracts. Since young people enter the labour market pri-
marily via temporary contracts, excessively high regulations
can lead to a closure of this gate to the labour market for
them, since employers do not hire new people. According to
these results, deregulation of temporary contracts has a pos-
itive effect on the labour market situation of young people.
For adults, however, the assumed best case is a combination
of high EPL for regular contracts, as this protects employ-
ers as labour market insiders from dismissals, but also high
regulations on temporary contracts, as employers would oth-
erwise have a huge incentive to simply convert regular con-
tracts into more insecure and less paid temporary contracts.
Gebel and Giesecke (2016) show two outcomes resulting
from a partial deregulation: First, employers are expected
to hire more workers because temporary contracts exonerate
them from the otherwise feared dismissal costs. This results
in a ’buffer’ of temporary jobs which employers can build up
and which can be quickly stocked up or dismantled depend-
ing on the market situation (Polavieja, 2003). For young
labour market entrants, deregulation therefore means that
jobs are created for them that would not exist otherwise with
a higher regulation of temporary contracts. Secondly, it is
argued that employers use temporary contracts as a ’screen-
ing tool’ (Korpi and Levin, 2001) and thus test whether the
worker’s skills match the company’s needs prior to final per-
manent recruitment. This mechanism is particularly relevant
for young people, as employers have no information about
the productivity in the labour market of new labour market
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Table 7: Robustness Check after 2000 – Ratio of youth-to-adult unemployment
Country clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
Dependent variable After 2000























































































































N 384 319 319 319 319 319 319
R2 0.0788 0.0657 0.0897 0.0803 0.1024 0.1289 0.1600
Table 8: Country Examples – Level of youth unemployment
Dependent Variable
Level of youth unemployment Countries with youth-to-adult unemployment rates >median
EPL regular EPL temporary Before 2000 After 2000
Strong Strong FRA, GRC, ITA, ESP, TUR FRA, GRC, ITA, POL, PRT, ESP, TUR
Weak FIN, SVK CZE, SVK, SWE
Weak Strong BEL BEL, FIN
Weak AUS, CAN, HUN, IRL, POL, GBR HUN, IRL
Table 9: Country Examples – Youth-to-adult unemployment rate
Dependent Variable
Youth-to-adult unemployment ratio Countries with youth-to-adult unemployment rates >median
EPL regular EPL temporary Before 2000 After 2000
Strong Strong FRA, GRC, ITA, KOR, PRT, SWE, TUR FRA, GRC, ITA, KOR, NOR, POL
Weak FIN, SVK CZE, SWE
Weak Strong BEL, NOR BEL, FIN
Weak USA, NZL, POL HUN, NZL, GBR
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Table 10: Overview Hypotheses and Results (1985-2013)
Notes: For some hypotheses the robustness checks reveal different results before and after 2000
* Strict EPL (temporary) = High youth-to-adult unemployment. ** Before 2000: Strict EPL (regular and temporary) = High youth-to-adult unemployment
*** Before 2000: Strict EPL (regular and temporary) = High youth-to-adult unemployment, After 2000: No interaction effect






H1: EPL on regular contracts has no significant impact on the level
of youth unemployment and the youth-to-adult unemployment ra-
tio
Confirmed Confirmed
H2: Strict EPL on temporary contracts is decreasing the level of
youth unemployment and the youth-to-adult unemployment ratio
Disproved -
No main effect Disproved*
H3: The level of youth unemployment and the youth-to-adult un-
employment ratio is lowest in countries with low EPL regular, high
EPL temporary
Disproved** -
No interaction effect Disproved***
H4: Vocational Specificity has no main effect on the level of youth
unemployment and the youth-to-adult unemployment ratio
Confirmed Confirmed
H5a: The level of youth unemployment and the youth-to-adult un-






H5b: The level of youth unemployment and the youth-to-adult un-
employment ratio is lowest in countries with high EPL (temporary)
and high vocational specificity
Disproved -
No interaction effect Disproved ****
entrants. More often they do not get a chance at all from em-
ployers to show their skills on the labour market in a highly
regulated environment. This also shows that a stronger reg-
ulation of temporary contracts and the elimination of this
screening tool for employers has different effects for young
people and adults. Adults will most likely already have a
labour market history, so that employers can assess their pro-
ductivity and fit for the company by their previous employ-
ments when hiring new adults. For young people, however,
there is no already existing work history in their school-to-
work transition, so that a stronger regulation of temporary
contracts leads to fewer young people being hired for new
jobs compared to adults.
After a possible explanation was given why a strict reg-
ulation of temporary contracts has a more severe effect on
young people and why a deregulation of these contracts can
be positive for the labour market situation of young people
in comparison to adults, a brief look will be taken at why this
thesis possibly came to different results than Breen (2005)
or Brzinsky-Fay (2017). The first difference is the choice of
countries and the period to be examined. Breen only exam-
ined a period from 1995-1999, so his results are more of a
snapshot without being able to pick up on changes and trends
over time. Brzinsky-Fay takes a period from 1990 to 2009,
which expands Breen’s study, but covers fewer years than
this thesis from 1985 to 2013. The end is set for 2009 to
avoid possible distortions from the global economic crisis that
might alter the post-2000 results of this thesis. Furthermore,
it is the novelty of this thesis that for the first time the inter-
play between the two EPL forms (regular and temporary) and
vocational specificity was examined. In addition, different
results can always be obtained if different sources were used
and the core variables were operationalised differently. Voca-
tional specificity by Breen was confined to upper secondary
education and in Brzinsky-Fay not further specified, while in
this thesis the vocational enrolment was chosen for the entire
secondary education. Breen and Brzinsky-Fay use the OECD
Education at a Glance publications for this purpose, while
this thesis vocational enrolment was manually calculated us-
ing the OECD database.
5. Conclusion
The results presented here support the argument from
Noelke (2015) that there is no effect of regular EPL on the
youth unemployment rate alone. High regulations on regu-
lar contracts only are thus not to blame for a high-level youth
unemployment or high youth-to-adult unemployment rates.
In line with previous research, it was expected that the dereg-
ulation of temporary contracts would have a negative im-
pact on the labour market situation of young people, as they
would be less protected. However, the results of this thesis
show a different picture - namely that a stronger regulation
of temporary contracts has a significantly negative effect on
the youth-to-adult unemployment rate. One possible expla-
nation for this is that employers are more inhibited in hir-
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ing new employees under higher regulation - on both regular
and temporary contracts - because they want to avoid higher
dismissal costs. Since young people are particularly often re-
cruited via temporary contracts and the screening function of
these contracts is an important indicator of the productivity
of future employees, stronger regulations of these contracts
have negative effects especially for young people, but not so
much for adults. The conclusion that can be drawn here is
that the effect of EPL for temporary contracts may not be as
one-sided as previously assumed in the literature, and that -
as with EPL for regular contracts - there are ambiguous re-
sults on its effect, depending on how a model is specified and
which countries and groups were considered over which pe-
riod.
As this thesis was built upon the work of Breen (2005)
and Brzinsky-Fay (2017) it was expected to find a statisti-
cally significant interaction between EPL and the vocational
specificity of an educational system. However, these find-
ings could not be validated, as no interaction was significant
over the whole time-period from 1985-2013. The robustness
check splitting this time in a pre- and post-2000 period how-
ever revealed, that at least for the ratio of youth-to-adult un-
employment the post-2000 period showed a significant inter-
action of EPL for temporary contracts and vocational speci-
ficity. The interaction though implies a negative effect of high
vocational specificity for young people, so that due to a lack
of sound theoretical arguments for this it is assumed that the
very small effects, which are predominantly only significant
at the 10% level, might be eliminated by changes in the coun-
try sample or the time period. Despite these seemingly am-
biguous results, it should however be clearly said that when
designing policies to reduce youth unemployment, institu-
tions should not be considered as stand-alone variables, but
always in their complex interaction with other institutions.
For future studies, it should be noted that certainly other
factors besides employment protection legislation and vo-
cational specificity influence youth unemployment, such as
union strength and bargaining power, which should be in-
vestigated. Micro level and longitudinal data could make
it possible to include more control variables and test more
detailed relationships and hypotheses. Furthermore, it has
already been pointed out in this thesis that the classifica-
tion of educational signalling based on the enrolment rate
does not adequately reflect the actual education systems of
the individual countries. Here, more in-depth country analy-
sis, both qualitative and quantitative, could provide a better
overview. Furthermore, it is possible to look at the labour
market situation of young people not only by looking at the
distinction between employed and unemployed but also by
looking at other indicators that can capture the situation of
young people (in comparison to adults), such as temporary
employment rates. An examination of the NEET rate instead
of the unemployment rates can moreover provide detailed
insights and a more realistic picture of the youth labour mar-
ket if sufficient data is available. Lastly, in this thesis, groups
were formed exclusively on the basis of age, while the influ-
ence of labour market regulations possibly also has different
consequences depending on one’s educational level and for
men and women. Future research should also see whether
the results can be generalised here, preferably by including
non-OECD countries.
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